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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
SOME ANOMALIES AND UNCERTAINTIES IN
MINNESOTA PLEADING
By G. W. C. Ross*
N OTWITHSTANDING Mr. Dunnell's protest,' it must be taken
as settled law in Minnesota that payment, e. g., in the ordi-
nary action for goods sold and delivered, or against the maker on
a promissory note, is an affirmative defence.2 That means, that
the complaint in such case need not allege non-payment; pay-
ment may first be alleged by defendant as new matter in his
answer, to be denied, if disputed, by plaintiff's reply. But such
complaints in Minnesota practically always do allege non-pay-
ment. Does the allegation tender issue as to the fact?
First State Bank of Grand Rapids v. Utman,3 was an action
against the endorser of a promissory note, who, however, had
waived demand, notice and protest. The complaint alleged that
the note was unpaid. The answer was a general denial, qualified
by admission of the execution of the note and its endorsement
by defendant. Plaintiff's demurrer to this answer was sustained
by our supreme court, Dibell, C., on the ground that the answer
did not put the fact of payment in issue. The court indulged in
no argument; they merely cited the dictum in First Nat. Bank of
Shakopee v. Strait.4 But the theory obviously is, that since the
complaint need not have alleged non-payment the allegation there-
of was "immaterial" and hence tendered no issue on the point,
and therefore the denial did not join issue on it. The further
logic of that holding of course would be, that if the answer had
explicitly alleged payment the same would have stood, not as a
contradiction (denial) of the complaint's allegation, but as new
matter, which would therefore stand admitted of record unless
the plaintiff denied it over again by reply. But this latter identi-
cal state of pleading was presented to the Minnesota court by
the early case of McArdle v. McArdle,5 and the court held flatly
contra. One of the causes of action there sued on was a promis-
sory note. The complaint alleged non-payment; the answer al-
*Professor, St. Thomas College of Law, St. Paul, Minnesota.
'Dunnell, Minnesota Pleading, 2d ed., 594, 831.
2First Nat. Bank of Shakopee v. Strait, (1898) 71 Minn. 69, 73 N. W.
645; First State Bank of Grand Rapids v. Utman, (1917) 136 Minn. 103,
161 N. W. 398.
3(1917) 136 Minn. 103, 161 N. W. 398.
4(1898) 71 Minn. 69, 73 N. W. 645.
5(1866) 12 Minn. 98.
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leged payment; there was no reply; and defendant accordingly
moved for judgment on the pleadings, for that the fact of pay-
ment stood admitted by the failure to reply. But the motion was
held properly denied; on the ground that the allegation of pay-
ment in the answer amounted merely to denial of the complaint's
allegation of non-payment and hence joined issue thereon and no
reply was needed. Denial of payment by reply would be simply
a repetition of the allegation in the complaint; and that is the
standard test of the necessity for reply. The AcArdle Case,
however, probably proceeds, not on the ground that an allegation
in the complaint needlessly anticipating a defence nevertheless
tenders issue thereon, but rather on the ground that the allegation
of non-payment is a necessary one in the complaint. The opinion
does not say that; but the only case the court cite G is based ex-
plicitly on that ground. In so far, therefore, the McArdle Case
is probably no longer good authority in Minnesota.
But the statement -that such an allegation, as non-payment in
the complaint is "immaterial" contains an ambiguity. In the
Utnan Case,7 the complaint contained, besides the allegation of
non-payment, the further allegation that payment had been de-
manded and refused. That was a truly immaterial allegation;
i. e., the fact alleged was immaterial. It made no difference to
the.rights of the parties whether payment had ever been demand-
ed or not. Hence it would properly be said, that the general
denial did not put such a fact in issue. But incidentally, that is
just what the court in the Utman Case did not say. On the
contrary, in the same opinion in which they say the general de-
nial did not put the allegation of non-payment in issue, they say
that it did put in issue the allegation of demand. That surely
is the height of absurdity. In the Utman Case it was "error
without prejudice," so to speak; because the court went on to
note that the fact of demand was immaterial anyhow, and so the
joinder of issue on it was immaterial. This is merely an awk-
ward and roundabout way of saying that no real issue was joined.
In truth, of course the general denial could not put such a fact
in issue. If the complaint had not alleged demand, but the an-
swer first had alleged that no demand ever was made, such alle-
gation would have tendered no issue on the point, and a specific
denial or counter-allegation in reply would not have joined issue
on it.- By no form of pleadings can a truly immaterial fact be
Wan Giesen v. Van Giesen, (1852) 10 N. Y. 316.
7(1917) 136 Minn. 103, 161 N. W. 398.
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put effectively in issue. But -the allegation of non-payment is
not immaterial in that sense. The statement that it is "immaterial"
means only that it is unnecessary in the complaint; the complaint
would state a good (prima facie) cause of action without it. But
to allege non-payment is to allege a material, nay, a crucial fact.
It is strictly an issuable fact. Is there any reason why effect
should not be given to the allegation? Is there any good reason
in the basic logic or principles of code pleading why parties should
be forced to put such a fact in issue only by answer and reply,
and be disabled from doing so by complaint and answer?
Undoubtedly at common law such an unnecessary allegation
in a declaration could not be traversed by the plea. The common
law regarded all unnecessary allegations as "immaterial" and did
not discriminate between the allegation of an inherently immaterial
fact and an allegation. needlessly anticipating a defence. But why
should this sort of technicality be perpetuated under the codes?
The common law was a stickler for its precise formalities. There
is the oft-cited illustration of the man alleged to be dead, and a
plea alleging him to be alive is said to be no good traverse.'
The way to deny that he was dead, is -to "deny that he is dead,"
or, perhaps, to allege that he is "not dead ;" but to allege him to be
alive was argumentative and so no effective traverse. But that
sort of hair-splitting is not code pleading. Argumentative denials,
while not deemed artistic, are effective under the code, if suffi-
ciently complete in scope and unequivocal." Code pleading is
concerned with the substance, the clear actual intent of the plead-
ers and the speedy administration of justice according to the
underlying merits, rather than with form and technicality of
pleading for its own sake. So when parties by any form of plead-
ing have made unequivocal and flatly contradictory statements
about any issuable fact, why should not that fact be deemed at
issue? As noted above, the usual test for the necessity of a reply
is, that reply is not necessary when it could only re-iterate the
allegations of the complaint; yet the logic of the Utman Case,10
makes the plaintiff do just that. What is at stake, that the de-
fendant should be required first to allege his defences, and that if
plaintiff has needlessly denied them by anticipation, he must nev-
ertheless re-iterate his denial in a reply?
8Gould, Pleading, 5th ed., pp. 364, 365.9Engel v. Bugbee, (1889) 40 Minn. 492, 42 N. W. 351.
10(1917) 136 Minn. 103, 161 N. W. 398.
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Authority for this view is not wanting in Minnesota. In the
case of Domis v. Johnson, 11 complaint for libel needlessly alleged
plaintiff's good reputation. In answer the defendant averred his
lack of any knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief
as to plaintiff's reputation. Under this answer defendant was
held entitled to offer evidence of plaintiffs bad reputation. Ad-
mitting that the complaint's allegation of plaintiff's good repute
needlessly anticipated matter of affirmative defence, the court
held that since it alleged a material fact it tendered issue thereon;
which accordingly was well joined by the answer. It is true that
this case might be distinguished on the ground, that plaintiffs
bad repute in libel action is matter, not strictly of defence, but
rather merely in mitigation of damage and hence might be held
provable without any explicit pleading on it at all, by either
party. But the court, while they note this position, prefer not to
so hold, but deliberately pass by that point and decide the case
squarely on the other ground. They say:
"The purpose of pleadings is to disclose the facts relied upon
for recovery or in defence. For this purpose no particular form of
words is necessary. . . .Of course, the affirmance and denial of
imiaterial 'matters does not present an issue to be tried. But a
plaintiff may unecessarily aver in his complaint a inatcrial fact,
. ..concerning which the burden of pleading and proof would
ordinarily rest upon the defendant, and by so doing enable the
defendant, by specific denial of such averment, to raise an issue
as to the fact. . ..When we regard the purposes of pleadings
it can make no possible difference whether, the complaint con-
taining no such averment, the defendant were to affirmatively
and specifically state in his answer that the plaintiff's reputation
was bad, or, the complaint alleging specifically that his reputation
was good, the defendant were to specifically deny the fact thus
averred. In either case the defendant unmistakably puts in issue
the material fact. It is no answer to say, that the plaintiff need
not have alleged his good reputation. He having done so, it
enabled the defendant to put the fact in issue by a pleading in
the language of a denial."'
It is submitted, that this reasoning is good common sense and
is in harmony with the true spirit and intent of code pleading.
The same question of pleading is presented in personal injury
actions, in relation to the matter of plaintiff's due care or con-
tributory negligence. A personal injury complaint need not al-
lege the plaintiff to have been in the exercise of due care, as we
11(1891) 47 Minn. 56, 49 N. W. 383.
12ltalics the author's. [Ed.l.
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shall see. But suppose it does so allege; does it thereby tender
issue thereon? The early Minnesota cases appeared to hold that
in personal injury actions generally the plaintiff's contributory
negligence is provable under answer by way of general denial;
on the theory that the complaint (necessarily) alleges defendant's
negligence to have been the sole cause of the injury, and hence
the general denial puts that fact in issue and evidence of plain-
tiff's contributory negligence goes merely to controvert it.Y' This
of course misconceives the substantive law concerning this tort.
But the question finally was given extended consideration by the
Minnesota court in the case of Hill v. Minneapolis Street Ry Co.1 4
Here the complaint did not negative plaintiff's contributory neg-
ligence. The answer was a general denial. At the trial the issue
of contributory negligence was submitted to the jury and verdict
for the defendant resulted; but on appeal, an order denying a
new trial was reversed; the court holding that contributory neg-
ligence was not in issue under the pleading. They review the
early cases above cited and declare that in those cases the com-
plaints did in fact deny plaintiff's contributory negligence, or
allege his due care, thus (needlessly) anticipating the defence;
and that it is inz such cases, and in such cases only, that issue is
joined on the point by answer consisting of general denial. They
say that contributory negligence is an affirmative defence, to be
so pleaded first by the defendant, "unless the plaintiff had ten-
dered the issue by alleging that the plaintiff was without fault.
ft must be definitely understood, that the decision in" St. Anthony
Falls Water Power Co. v. Eastman' "merely holds that a general
denial puts plaintiff's negligence in issue when the complaint al-
leges that he is free from negligence, and that" Hocum v. Waith-
erick 6 "simply holds that under such a state of pleadings the
burden is still on the defendant to prove the contributory negli-
gence of plaintiff." A more explicit repudiation of the rule of
the Utman Case, and recognition of the principle this article is
contending for, it would be hard to find. Hill v. Minneapolis
Street Ry. Co. was approved in the case of Lee v. Leighton Co.' 7
And compare the vigorous dissenting opinion of Hobson, J., in
13St. Anthony's Falls Water Power Co. v. Eastman, (1874) 20 Minn.
277; Hocum v. Weitherick, (1875) 22 Minn. 152, 156.
14(1910) 112 Minn. 503, 128 N. W. 831.
15(1874) 20 Minn. 277.
16(1875) 22 Minn. 152.
17(1911) 113 Minn. 373, 376, 129 N. W. 767.
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the Kentucky case of Louisville & Nashville Ry. Co. v. Paynter's
Adm'x.'l
It is possible, that in the Utnian Case the Minnesota court
meant to go no further than to hold that a general denial would
not put the allegation of non-payment in issue; but that if the
answer had alleged payment in affirmative terms they would have
held that it did join the issue without reply, following McArdle
v. McArdle. But they suggest nothing of the kind, and no such
distinction can be supported on principle. For payment alleged
affirmatively could be held to join the issue only on the ground
that it constitutes merely an argumentative denial of the allega-
tion of non-payment. Otherwise, it would not join the issue, but
would tender it; to be joined only by reply. But an argumentative
denial can hardly be more effective than an explicit denial. If
payment alleged affirmatively can be given effect as denial of the
allegation of nonpayment, surely a specific denial of the non-
payment must be equally effective against demurrer, though it
might be assailable as indefinite on motion directed to that point.
And a general denial is merely specific denial applied seriatim to
each (traversable) allegation of the complaint.
The Minnesota cases do disclose one possible reason, perhaps
of some practical cogency, in favor of the rule of the Utnan Case
and against that of Dennis v. Johnson0 and Hill v. Mimeapolis
Street Ry. Co.20 It is suggested by the extract quoted obove from
the opinion in the Hill Case, last mentioned; where the court say
that the earlier, Weitherick Case2  simply holds that under a per-
sonal injury complaint alleging plaintiff's due care and an answer
by way-of general denial, while the plaintiff's contributor- neg-
ligence is at issue, yet "under such a state of pleadings the burden
is still on the defendant to prove the contributory negligence of
plaintiff." Shortly after the court had decided the case of Dennis
v. Johnson,22 the case of Lotto v. Davenport23 came up. Loito v.
Davenport also was a libel action, with the same state of plead-
ings as in Dennis v. Johnson. And relying on the (then) recent
decision in Dennis v. Johnson, the defendant in Lotto v. Daven-
port offered no evidence as to plaintiff's bad reputation; contend-
ing, that since plaintiff had tendered the issue on his reputation and
18(1904) 26 Ky. L. Rep. 761, 82 S. W. 412.
19(1891) 47 Minn. 56, 49 N. W. 383.
20(1910) 112 Minn. 503, 128 N. WV. 831.
23(1875) 22 Minn. 152.
22(1891) 47 Minn. 56, 49 N. W. 383.
2-(1892) 50 Minn. 99, 52 N. W. 130.
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
defendant had merely joined it by denial, the burden was on
plaintiff to prove, or at least to go forward with the evidence, of
his good reputation. But the court immediately corrected this
false impression and explained that the rule of Dennis v. Johnson
was a rule of pleading purely; but that, though the issue was ef-
fectively made up by complaint and answer instead of by answer
and reply, yet the point at issue remained matter of (affirmative)
defence, and notwithstanding the state of the pleadings the bur-
den remained on defendant to prove or at least first adduce evi-
dence of plaintiff's bad reputation. And so in the opinion as
quoted, in Hill v. Minneapolis Street Ry. Co., the court hasten
to point out, that while plaintiff tenders issue by alleging his due
care in his complaint, to be well joined by answer consisting of
general denial, yet it remains for the defendant to prove plain-
tiff's contributory negligence. This suggests that the rule here
advocated, allowing the issue to be anticipated, so to speak, in the
pleadings, does conduce to a certain confusion. It tends to slur
over the difference between necessary and unnecessary allega-
tions and imposes on judges and lawyers the intellectual labor
of knowing, dehors the pleadings, what are inherently matters of
affirmative defence, and of remembering that regardless of how
the issue may be framed by the pleadings, matters properly of
affirmative defence remain such as far as the burden of proof
or evidence is concerned. It would seem on the whole, however,
that this degree of extra mental effort and penetration should not
be beyond the caliber of the profession, on and off the bench, in
Minnesota. It is submitted that the case of the First State Bank
of Grand Rapids v. Utman,2 4 should be overruled by our court at
its next opportunity, both as inconsistent with other leading Min-
nesota cases, and as out of harmony with the proper principles and
fundamental intent of code pleading.
II.
The earliest Minnesota cases held, that in response to certain
allegations (e.g., of value) an answer by way of general denial
was bad as negative pregnant.2 5 These cases were properly over-
ruled in German-American Bank v. White.20  But a specific de-
nial may still be bad in Minnesota for pregnancy. Thus, in the
24(1917) 136 Minn. 103, 161 N. W. 398.
25Dean v. Leonard, (1864) 9 Minn. 190; Dunnell, Pleading, 2d ed.,
323, note 75.
26(1888) 38 Minn. 471, 38 N. W. 361.
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case of Pidlen v. Wright,27 in answer to a complaint on a prom-
issory note the defendant counterclaimed for breach of warranties
in connection with the sale of a stock of goods. The warranties
alleged, were that the tea chest was full of tea and that the baking
powder and molasses were in good condition. Plaintiff in reply
"denied that he warranted that the tea chest was full of tea and
that the baking powder and molasses were in good condition ;"
and on these pleadings it was held that the making of the war-
ranties stood admitted, the attempted specific denial being preg-
nant. So far, so good. But this reply contained also a "qualified
general denial" in usual form; wherefore the plaintiff urged, that
if the warranties were not (effectively) specifically denied, they
were put in issue by the qualified general denial. But held not
so; but that the point was controlled by the attempted specific
denial. The court say:
"Allegations thus specifically attempted to be denied are not
included in a general denial in the same pleading, which assumes
to deny each allegation not previously denied. A party cannot be
permitted to experiment in this way. His intention as to such
allegations is sufficiently indicated by the form of denial selected,
whether it is construed to be good or bad."
And then comes along the case of Fitzpatrick v. Sinonson
Bros. Mfg. Co.2S This was an action to quiet title. Defendant
in answer set up two tax titles held by him. Plaintiff's reply be-
gan with a qualified general denial; then it specifically alleged
that the two tax titles were "wholly void and of no force or effect."
At the trial defendant refrained from proving his tax titles, claim-
ing that they stood admitted on the pleadings. Under the rule
of Puilen v. Wriglht,29 they certainly did. The specific allegation of
the reply in respect to the tax titles was clearly bad as setting up
mere conclusion of law; a vice certainly as bad (i.e., ineffective)
as pregnancy. But the supreme court affirmed judgment for the
plaintiff; holding the tax titles in issue under the qualified general
denial of the reply. Per Lovely, J.: "Specific averments, however,
to control general statements in pleadings, must not only be suffi-
cient for one, but for all legal purposes." Pleading the conclusion
of law "is not only ineffective to traverse the tax judgments,
but also worthless to limit the scope of the previous" qualified
"general denial." Yet the court do not assume to overrule Pul-
len v. Wright. They do not mention it, or indicate that they
27(1885) 34 Minn. 314, 26 N. W. 394.
28(1902) 86 Minn. 140, 90 N. W. 378.
29(1885) 34 Minn. 314, 26 N. W. 394.
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ever heard of it. Perhaps they never had; though it is not an iso-
lated case.30
The net result is, that in the next case that may come up, with
both Pullen v. Wright and Fitzpatrick v. Simonson Bros. Mfg.
Co.31 duly called to their attention, it is impossible to be sure
which way our supreme court will jump; or whether they may
draw a fanciful distinction for this purpose between pregnancy and
pleading conclusion of law, so as to sustain both cases. To the
writer it seems unfortunate that the qualified general denial ever
was permitted in this state.32 It certainly has proved itself pro-
ductive of confusion, obscurity and uncertainty in pleading, and
all in high degree. It is used as a catch-all basket by the careless
and becomes a trap for the unwary practitioner. Its only benefit
is in furnishing the bench a convenient handle wherewith to
construe the pleading as closely or as loosely as their mood or the
exigency of the particular occasion may dictate. But the qualified
general denial has become firmly settled in our practice; and that
being so, the rule of the Fitzpatrick Case would seem more en-
lightened and in better accord with the fundamental maxim cf
liberal construction with a view to substantial justice, than the
technical holding of Pullen v. Wright.
III.
In the case of Meachem v. Cooper,33 the complaint alleged
breach of warranty on sale of a horse: "whereby the plaintiff has
s-ustained damage" to a stated sum. At the trial, plaintiff over
objection proved the horse's actual value (or valuelessness) and
what its value would have been had it conformed to the warranty;
and on appeal from an order denying new trial after verdict for
plaintiff, the order was affirmed. The court hold, that although
the complaint stated no facts measuring the damages, yet the gen-
eral damages, being the indicated difference in values, were prob-
able under the bare ad damnum. The opinion would indicate
that the complaint was wholly silent as to values. Examination
of the paper-book discloses, however, that the complaint (lid al-
lege that the horse was actually worthless, and also stated the
amount plaintiff paid for it. This last, however, of course does
not give the proper measure of damages; so the supreme court
30Compare Davenport v. Ladd, (1888) 38 Minn. 545, 38 N. W. 622.
31(1902) 86 Minn. 140, 90 N. W. 378.
32Compare Kingsley v. Gilman, *(1867) 12 Minn. 515.
23(1886) 36 Minn. 227, 30 N. W. 669.
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rightly say, that the complaint did not state facts measuring the
damage. And in the case of Ennis v. Buckeye Publishing Co.,3"
the complaint was entirely silent as to facts relating to damage;
merely stating the making of the contract and its breach, "to the
damage of the plaintiff in the sum of $3,100." And the holding
was the same, to-wit:- That under this bare ad damnum all gen-
eral damages were properly provable and recoverable.
But then in the case of Piano Mfg. Co. v. Richards, the
court undertake to define the "essentials" of a sufficient plead-
ing for breach of warranty, and say that it must allege, inter alia,
"the facts from which damage are to be inferred."30 This appears
to mean, that it must allege the facts showing (constituting) ac-
tual (substantial) damage and, i. e., measuring the same. The
statement is reiterated, per P. E. Brown, J., in the later case of
Bradstreet Co. v. Four Traction Auto Co.37 It is submitted this ig-
nores the distinction between general and special damages; or
else it confuses action for breach of warranty with action for
deceit. It is true that in an action for deceit the facts constitut-
ing actual (substantial) damage must be specifically alleged. Such
damage is "of the gist of" that particular tort (i.e., it is part of
the very cause of action itself) ; or, in common parlance, it is no
tort to lie to a man unless by your lying you cheat him out of
some money or money's worth; deceit as a tort thus differing
in this regard from, e. g., assault.3 s But action for breach of
warranty is an action on contract; and in actions on contract it
is regularly held that the breach of contract by itself constitutes
a complete cause of action entitling plaintiff to nominal damages
at least; and by the same line of reasoning, that "general dam-
ages" inhere in breach of contract and hence are recoverable under
bare ad damnum, without being specially pleaded. 39 The mis-
leading statement in the Plano Mfg. Co. Case and the Bradstreet
Co. Case, should be disapproved.
34(1990) 44 Minn. 105, 46 N. W. 314.
35(1902) 86 Minn. 94, 90 N. W. 120.3GPer Lovely, J. at p. 96. Italics the author's. [Ed.].
37(1912) 118 Minn. 454, 459, 137 N. W. 180.
3sCompare Parker v. Jewett, (1893) 52 Minn. 514; 55 N. W. 56.
39Dunnell, Pleading, 2d ed., 623 and cases cited; and compare Burns
v. Jordan, (1890) 43 Minn. 25, 44 N. W. 523; Cowley v. Davidson, (1865)
10 Minn. 392.
